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This chapter reviews the purpose and use of models from the field 
of complex systems and, in particular, the implications of trying to 
use models to understand or make decisions within complex 
situations, such as policy makers usually face. A discussion of the 
different dimensions one can formalise situations, the different 
purposes for models and the different kinds of relationship they 
can have with the policy making process, is followed by an 
examination of the compromises forced by the complexity of the 
target issues. Several modelling approaches from complexity 
science are briefly described, with notes as to their abilities and 
limitations.  These approaches include system dynamics, network 
theory, information theory, cellular automata, and agent-based 
modelling. Some examples of policy models are presented and 
discussed in the context of the previous analysis. Finally we 
conclude by outlining some of the major pitfalls facing those 
wishing to use such models for policy evaluation. 
Introduction	  
For policy and decision-making, models can be an essential 
component, as models allow the description of a situation, the 
exploration of future scenarios, the valuation of different 
outcomes and the establishment of possible explanations for what 
is observed. The principle problem with this is the sheer 
complexity of what is being modelled.  A response to this is to use 
more expressive modelling approaches, drawn from the “sciences 
of complexity”—use more complex models to try and get a hold 
on the complexity we face.  However, this approach has potential 
pitfalls as well as opportunities, and it is these that this chapter will 
attempt to make clear.  Thus, we hope to show that more complex 
modelling approaches can be useful, but also to help people 
“fooling themselves” in the process. 
 The chapter starts with an examination of the different kinds 
of model that exist, so that these kinds might be clearly 
distinguished and not confused.  A section follows on the kinds of 
uses to which such models can be put. Then we look at some of 
the consequences of the fact that what we are modelling is 
complex and the kinds of compromises this forces us into, 
followed by some examples of models applied to policy issues.  We 
conclude by summarising some of the key danger and 
opportunities for using complex modelling for policy analysis. 
Kinds	  of	  Model	  
A model is an abstraction of a phenomenon. A useful model has to be 
simpler than the phenomenon but to capture the relevant aspects 
of it. However, what needs to be represented in a model and what 
can be safely left out is often a matter of great subtlety. Since 
relevance changes with context, some models will be useful in 
some circumstances and useless in others.  Also, a model that is 
useful for one purpose may well be useless for another.  Many of 
the problems associated with the use of models to aid the 
formulation and steering of policy derive from an assumption that 
a model will have value for a purpose or in a context different 
form the one the model was established and validated for.  In 
other words, the value of a model is seen to be in its representation 
(e.g. simulation code) and not in its social embedding. 
 Generally speaking, all of epistemology deals with models. 
That is to say that all our descriptions can be thought of as models: 
they are abstractions of the phenomena with which we deal. These 
abstractions are required in order to understand and communicate 
about the complex phenomena that we have to deal with.  
However, models, in this most general sense, are not necessarily 
either precise or formal.  Indeed, most of the models we use in 
everyday life are informal and couched in a language that is open 
to a considerable degree of interpretation.  Two dimensions of 
formality can be distinguished:  
a) the extent to which the referents of the representation are 
constrained, e.g. by definition (“specificity of reference” or 
SR),  
b) the extent to which the ways in which instantiations of the 
representation can be manipulated are constrained, e.g. by 
rules of logical deduction (“specificity of manipulation” or 
SM).   
These two dimensions are illustrated in figure 1, below. 
 
Figure 1. Two dimensions of formality 
For example, an analogy expressed in natural language has a low 
SR  since, what its parts refer to are reconstructed by each hearer 
in each situation.  For example, the phrase “a tidal wave of crime” 
implies that concerted and highly coordinated action is needed in 
order to prevent people being engulfed, but the level of danger and 
what (if anything) is necessary to do must be determined by each 
listener. In contrast to this is a detailed description where what it 
refers to is severely limited by its content, e.g. “Recorded burglaries in 
London rose by 15% compared to the previous year”.  
 A system of abstract logic, mathematics or computer code has 
high SM since the ways these can be manipulated is determined by 
precise rules—what one person infers from them can be exactly 
replicated by another. This in contrast to a piece of natural 
language which can be used to draw inferences in many different 
ways, only limited by the manipulators’ imagination and linguistic 
ability.  However, just because a representation has high SM does 
not mean that the meaning of its parts in terms of what it 
represents is well determined.  Many simulations, for example, do 
not represent anything we observe directly, but are rather 
explorations of ideas.  We, as intelligent interpreters, may mentally 
fill in what it might refer to in any particular context, but these 
“mappings” to reality are not well defined.  Such models are more 
in the nature of an analogy, albeit one in formal form – they are 
not testable in a scientific manner since it is not clear as to 
precisely what they represent.  Thus simulations, especially agent-
based simulations, can give a false impression of their applicability 
because they are readily interpretable (but informally).  This does 
not mean they are useless for all purposes. For example, Schelling’s 
abstract simulation of racial segregation did not have any direct 
referents in terms of anything measurable1, but it was an effective 
                                 
1 Subsequent elaborations of this model have tried to make the relationship to what is observed 
counter-example that can show that an assumption that 
segregation must be caused by strong racial prejudice was 
unsound.  Thus such ‘analogical models’ (those with low  SR) can 
give useful insights, they can inform thought, but they can not give 
reliable forecasts or explanations as to what is observed. 
 Formal models are a key aspect of science, since scientific 
models aim at describing and understanding phenomena. Their 
formality is important because that means that both their inference 
and meaning is (a) checkable by others and (b) stable.  This makes 
it possible for a community of researchers and others to work 
collectively with the same models, confident that they are not each 
interpreting them in different ways.  As the above discussion 
should have made clear, they can be formal in (at least) two 
different ways.  For example data is a formal model of some aspect 
of what we observe, in the sense that it abstracts but in a well 
defined way – its meaning is precise.  Data is not formal in terms 
of SM  however, and one could make very different inferences 
from the same set of data.  Usually “formal modelling” means that 
the inference from a model is well specified, in other words it is a 
representation with high SM .  Thus scientific modelling is often 
associated with mathematics or computer simulation.  However, in 
order to connect the formal inference to data it has to be formal in 
the SR  sense as well, there needs to be a precise mapping between 
its parts and processes to what is observed, which is usually2 done 
in terms of a map to some data.  
The	  Use	  of	  Models	  
There are many purposes for models, including: as a game, an 
                                                                                                        
more direct, but the original model, however visually suggestive, was not related to any data. 
2 It is possible to directly ‘wire’ something like a computational process to reality via sensors and 
actuators, as happens in programmed trading, in this case it is not always clear the extent to which 
the model is a representation of anything observed, but more an embedded participant in it. 
aesthetic construction, or an illustration of some idea3.  Most 
scientific models claim to be predictive, i.e. they should allow us to 
obtain information about the future of the phenomenon before it 
occurs. For example, one can calculate and predict a ballistic 
trajectory aiming at a target using a mechanical model. However, 
on closer examination, many are more concerned with two other 
goals: explanation or exploration, with that of prediction being left as 
a theoretical possibility only4.  There are many scientific models 
that are not predictive, or which only predict abstract properties. 
For example, the Gutenberg–Richter law describes the distribution 
of earthquake intensities, but this does not tell us when might be 
the next earthquake nor how intense it might be.  Darwin’s theory 
of evolution does not tell us what will evolve next, or even the 
reasons why what has evolved did so, but it does predict the 
relationship between genetic distance and the length of time since 
species diverged.  Unfortunately many reports about models are 
not clear as to their purpose in this regard, indeed many seem to 
deliberately conflate different purposes.  Whilst models may have 
more than one goal, one should be wary of a model that was 
developed and tested for one purpose but is now being used for 
another.  A clear case of this is where a model is designed to 
establish a theoretical counter-example (such as in the Schelling 
case discussed below) but then is later claimed to be for prediction 
(albeit in a modified form). 
 There is another, very basic, distinction in the way models are 
used in practice.  That is between models that (a) represent 
something observed and ones which (b) are a component of an 
adaptive strategy.   
                                 
3 (Epstein, 2008) lists 16 different reasons, (Edmonds, et al. 2013) considers reasons that are more 
connected with understanding human society. 
4 It is common for papers describing them to list prediction as “future work” when the model is 
more fully developed. 
 In the former case, there is a well-defined mapping between 
the model and observational data/measurements, and the model is 
judged as to the extent of its error in its predictions of its target 
phenomena.  Here the model is, to different degrees and ways, 
either correct or not. In this case an examination of the model can 
tell us something about the structure of what is modelled, for 
example by exploring “what-if” questions using the model.  For 
sake of clarity we call this a “representational” model. 
 In the later case, the model is part of a decision making 
process to select strategies for action.  It takes (processed) inputs 
from the world, for example indicators of success and the model is 
changed depending on how well it is doing (for example by 
depreciating the parts of the model that resulted in a poor 
indicator).  Outputs from the model are used in the determination 
of interventions.  Here the model is continually being adapted 
according to events, it somehow encodes past successes or failures 
for different courses of action given different observations of the 
world.  Here a useful model may not represent any aspect of the 
world at all, but just be a useful intermediary in the process of 
decision making.  However, if the process of adaption is effective 
it may come to encode knowledge as to what works and what does 
not.  We call this an “adaptive” model. 
 It may well be that an adaptive use of a model is more 
effective in a particular setting, particular if a considerable period 
of adaption has occurred, in effect training the model (given the 
decision making structure it is embedded in) using a considerable 
amount of feedback from its policy environment.  If the model is 
sufficiently flexible (i.e. has many adjustable internal parameters) 
that it could indicate the correct action from the available inputs 
(derived from observations of the environment) then, with enough 
training, the model will eventually do so.  However, this kind of 
model adaption means that it is probably finely tuned to the 
particular situation and will not be useful by others in similar 
situations.  Nor is it likely to be much use in exploring what would 
happen in cases not yet observed; so if the situation changes in 
some fundamental way, the model may well give totally the wrong 
answers. Furthermore, it might not be apparent from an inspection 
of the adapted model, why it works. 
 Representational models are usually hard to develop, taking 
considerable time and effort, often by a team of experts somewhat 
separate from those making policy decisions.  Such models usually 
rely on some theory of the system being modelled, whose 
assumptions may be explicit.  This kind of model, if it validates 
well, might have some validity outside its original test situation, 
and moreover, its assumptions and structure might give clues as to 
when and how it might reliably be used.  If the situation changes in 
a way that is explicitly encoded into the model, one might be able 
to change its settings to suit the new situation. 
 In practice, models are often used with a mixture of adaptive 
and representational models, with adaptive models encapsulating 
some theory and being somewhat representational, and 
representational models undergoing some process of model 
adaption over time.  In this case it is wise to know which aspects 
of ones model are representational and which have been ‘tuned’ to 
the particular situation or set of data. 
 Models are limited and using them carelessly can have 
counterproductive consequences. One of the main limitations is 
due to the complexity of their subject matter, which is what we 
discuss next. 
Complexity	  and	  its	  Implications	  for	  Modelling	  
That society is complex may seem an obvious statement. Still, the 
ways in which it is complex has implications for the use of models 
for the planning and execution of policy.  One problem is the lack 
of agreement as to what “being complex” means. There are dozens 
different definitions of complexity (Edmonds, 2000). Frequently 
the word is used as a kind of negative. When available techniques 
(or accepted techniques) fail we call what were trying to analyse, 
“complex”—in this case it is a “dustbin concept”, a category to 
use when others fail. Here, in order to obtain a common 
understanding of the term, we can use its etymology. Complexity 
comes from the Latin plexus, which means interwoven. Thus 
something complex is difficult to separate out into separate 
components or processes. This is because of relevant interactions 
(Gershenson and Heylighen, 2005; Gershenson, 2013a). 
Interactions are relevant when the future of an element of a system 
is partially determined by the interactions, in other words, if one 
eliminates these interactions then the future would be significantly 
different. 
 Traditionally, models have been reductionist, in the sense that 
they study phenomena in isolation. By definition, interactions are 
excluded. Either an element is modelled in isolation, or a whole 
system is modelled, averaging the properties of its elements. In 
other words, traditionally phenomena are modelled at a single 
scale. This approach is suitable for simple systems, but it is not 
sufficient for complex ones, where the properties of the system are 
a consequence of the interactions of the elements. This requires 
models to be multi-scale (Bar-Yam, 2004), and interactions must 
be modelled to relate different scales.  
 In terms of policy models, interactions need to be included in 
the model if the future projections are not to be distorted. Simple 
models that do not include interactions will be unreliable. Such 
interactions carry important implications for modelling complex 
systems. These all make the ideal of the assessment of the impact 
of policy interventions using a model difficult. 
 Firstly, it implies that elements cannot be studied in isolation. 
Different social processes can interact to produce effects different 
from those caused by each process singly. The outcome from a 
population that is both disaffected and has access to an effective 
medium for dissemination of views (e.g. twitter) might well be very 
different to that of a disaffected population with only local gossip 
or a satisfied population with something like twitter.  The impact 
of this is that separately analysing the impacts of different factors 
upon the outcome might well be misleading; one has to consider 
the outcomes from the whole system.  This leads to the problem 
that one might well not know how much one needs to include in 
an model adequate for ones purposes, and that an approach that 
starts with the simplest possible model and then experimentally 
adds processes one at a time, might never get you to an adequate 
model (Edmonds & Moss, 2005). 
 Secondly, it implies that interactions generate novel information, 
which is not present in initial or boundary conditions. This new 
information inherently limits the predictability of a complex 
system. In other words, the results are at least partially ‘caused’ by 
processes within the system, and not by external factors that can 
be controlled for.  At best, this may mean that one has to make do 
with a broad distribution of outcomes as a forecast, or the 
prediction of ‘weaker’, second-order properties of the outcome 
(e.g. the volatility of the focus outcomes, or what will not happen).  
At worst, it may mean that there is no well-defined distribution of 
outcomes at all, with any measures upon the outcomes from a 
model being due to artefacts (e.g. model size). 
 The result of such difficulties means that any policy model is 
inevitably a compromise between different desirable modelling 
goals.  Figure 2 below illustrates some of these tensions in a simple 
way. 
 
Figure 2. Some of the tensions implicit in modelling complex systems. 
These illustrated desiderata all refer to the model that is being 
used.  Simplicity is how simple the model is, the extent to which the 
model itself can be completely understood.  Analytically solvable 
mathematical models, most statistical models and abstract 
simulation models are at the relatively simple end of the spectrum.  
Clearly a simple model has many advantages in terms of using the 
model, checking it for bugs and mistakes (Galan, et al. 2009) and 
communicating it. However, when modelling complex systems, 
such as those policy makers face, such simplicity may not be worth 
it if gaining it means a loss of other desirable properties.  Generality 
is the extent of the model scope: how many different kinds of 
situation could the model be usefully applied.  Clearly some level of 
generality is desirable; otherwise one could only apply the model in 
a single situation. Authors are often rather lax about making the 
scope of their models clear—often implying a greater level of 
generality that can be substantiated. Formality is what was called 
specificity of reference (SR) above.  Models where the meaning of 
the model parts are well-defined have such formality, those which 
do not, and are more in the way of a model of ideas about some 
target system, rather than the system directly have less of this.  
Finally validity means the extent to which the model outcomes 
match what is observed to occur—it is what is established in the 
process of model validation. This might be as close a match as a 
point forecast, or as loose as projecting qualitative aspects of 
possible outcomes. 
 What policy makers want, above all, is validity, with generality 
(so they do not have to keep going back to the modellers) and 
simplicity (so there is an accessible narrative to build support for 
any associated policy) coming after this.  Formality is for them is 
not a virtue but more of a problem, they may be convinced it is 
necessary (so as to provide the backing of ‘science’), but it means 
that the model is inevitably somewhat opaque to them and not 
entirely under their control.  Modellers, usually, have very different 
priorities.  Formality is very important to them so that they can 
replicate their results and so that the model can be unambiguously 
passed to other researchers for examination, critique and further 
development (Edmonds 2000).  Simplicity and generality are nice if 
you can get them, but one cannot assume that these are achievable 
(Edmonds 2012).  Validity should be an overwhelming priority for 
modellers; otherwise they are not doing any sort of empirical 
science. However, they often put this off into the future, preferring 
the attractions of the apparent generality offered by analogical 
models (Edmonds 2001, Edmonds 2012).  Relatively simple 
models that explore ideas rather than relate to any observed data 
that give the illusion of generality are, unfortunately, common. 
 Another ramification of the complexity of what is being 
modelled is in the goal of modelling—what sort of purpose the 
model suitable for.  One of the consequences of this is that 
prediction of policy matters is hard, rare, and only obtained as a 
result of the most specific and pragmatic kind of modelling 
developed over relatively long periods of time5.  It is more likely 
that a model is appropriate for establishing and understanding 
candidate explanations of what is happening, which will inform 
policy making in a less exact manner than prediction, being part of 
the mix of factors that a policy maker will take into account when 
deciding action.  It is common for policy people to want a 
prediction of the impact of possible interventions “however 
rough”, rather than settle for some level of understanding of what 
is happening, however this can be illusory. If one really wanted a 
prediction “however rough” one would settle for a random 
prediction6 dressed up as a complicated “black box” model.  If we 
are wiser, we should accept the complexity of what we are dealing 
and reject models that give us ill-founded predictions. 
 One feature of complex systems is that they can result in 
completely unexpected outcomes, where due to the relevant 
interactions in the system, a new kind of process has developed 
resulting in qualitatively different results.  It is for this reason that 
complex models of these systems do not give probabilities (since 
these may be meaningless, or worse be downright misleading) but 
rather trace some (but not all) of the possible outcomes.  This is 
useful as one can then be as prepared as possible for such 
outcomes, which otherwise would not have been thought of. 
 The effective use of models for policy formulation will thus 
involve a clear focus as to its purpose and its manner of use 
combined with some compromise between the factors discussed 
above.  However, the extent and impact of such compromises 
should be openly and honestly made, as a proper balance is 
necessary for reliable uses of the model.  It is probable that a 
combination of related models, each making different 
                                 
5 For an account of actual forecasting and its reality, see Silver (2012). 
6 Or other null model, such as “what happened last time” or “no change”. 
compromises might be a productive way forward.  However, this 
requires extra work and care. 
 We now look at a number of different approaches, 
commenting upon the compromises and properties of each. 
Tools	  and	  Approaches	  
System	  Dynamics	  
System dynamics is an approach to modelling that represents a 
system in terms of a set of interconnected feedback loops 
(Forrester, 1971).  It models these in terms of a series of flows 
between stocks plus additional connections between variables and 
flows.  Crucially, it allows the representation of delays in such 
feedback and that the outcomes of some variables can 
control/effect the rate of other flows.  These flows and 
relationships can then be simulated on a computer and (more 
recently) visualized.  Its advantages are that a complex set of 
feedback relationships can be explored and hence better 
understood.  However, in practice, the variables it deals with are 
themselves abstract entities, often representing abstract and 
aggregate quantities.  This approach is not well suited to the 
modelling of systems where internal heterogeneity is significant in 
terms of determining the outcomes. 
Network	  Theory	  
Networks naturally describe complex systems, representing 
elements as nodes and their interactions explicitly as links. Only in 
the last decade, there has been an explosion in the scientific 
exploration of networks and their application to a broad range of 
domains.  Network theory has its roots in graph theory as 
proposed by Euler in the eighteenth century. However, it is only 
recently that its use has become widespread, in part because of the 
large computing power and big data sets available.  
 Networks are useful for representing the structure of systems, 
indicating how elements interact. However, they can also represent 
the function of systems, with nodes representing states and directed 
links representing transitions. Relating the structure and function 
of systems is one of the most common questions for 
understanding systems, i.e. how changes in the structure affect the 
function of a system? Network theory can be used to study both 
structure and function using the same formalism. Also, adaptive 
and temporal networks (Gross & Sayama, 2009; Holme & 
Saramäki, 2012) have been used to study the change in time of 
network structure. 
 From the study of different natural and artificial networks, it 
has been found that most of them do not have a trivial topology, 
i.e. there is a relevant organization in their structure. Still, several 
modelling approaches assume homogeneous topologies, as in 
cellular automata (see below), or even a so called “well mixed” 
population, i.e. there is no structure considered (only the macro 
state). It has been shown that structure (micro scale) plays a crucial 
role in the dynamics of such systems. For example, the same 
system may change drastically its dynamics depending on whether 
the local structure is considered or not (Shnerb et al., 2000).  
 Network models can be useful to study several aspects related 
to policy and decision making. For example, random agent 
networks (RANs) were proposed to model organizations such as 
bureaucracies (Gershenson, 2008), showing how few modifications 
to the structure of an organization can improve considerably its 
performance. In general, “computing networks” (Gershenson, 
2010) can be used to study and relate adaptability at different 
scales. Since policy and decisions are usually made over changing 
and uncertain scenarios, adaptability is a desired property of 
models.  However, the more networks change and the complexity 
of the interactions represented over the links get, the less classic 
network theory is applicable, and the closer to an individual-based 
model one has. 
Information	  theory	  
Claude Shannon (1948) proposed information theory in the 
context of telecommunications. He was interested on how a 
message could be transmitted reliably over unreliable media. He 
proposed a measure of information (equivalent to the Boltzmann-
Gibbs entropy in thermodynamics) where information is minimal 
for regular strings, as new symbols do not carry new information. 
Shannon information is maximal for random strings, as new 
symbols carry all the new information, i.e. they are not predictable. 
Several other measures have been derived from Shannon's 
information, such as mutual information, predictive information, 
excess entropy, and information transfer, among others 
(Prokopenko et al., 2009). 
 Information theory has been used repeatedly to measure 
complexity. However, there are two different views. One view 
implies a similarity of information to complexity, where maximum 
randomness (Shannon information) would have maximum 
complexity. A more popular view poses that complexity is maximal 
when a balance between regularity (order) and randomness (chaos) 
is reached (Langton, 1990; Kauffman, 1993). 
 Recently, measures of complexity, emergence, self-
organization, homeostasis, and autopoiesis were proposed based 
on information theory (Fernández et al., 2014). These measures are 
fast to compute and simple enough to be used by people without a 
strong mathematical background, but can give insights into the 
dynamics of systems. It has been argued (Edmonds 1999) that 
there is not one such measure that can always be used, but rather 
one has to choose a measure that gives meaningful results for the 
kind of system that one is considering.  Thus this approach 
assumes that one has understood the target system sufficiently to 
select the appropriate measure. 
 For decision making, it is vital to identify which type of 
dynamics are followed by systems and their components, as 
different decisions should be made depending on regular, complex, 
or chaotic dynamics. Used correctly, these measures can provide 
precisely this information and thus aid in knowing how to respond 
to change in the systems. 
Cellular	  automata	  
Cellular automata (CA) can be seen as a particular type of network. 
Each cell (node) has a state that depends on the states of its 
neighbours (links) and its own previous state. Different CA models 
can have different number of states and consider different number 
of neighbours. Cells can also be arranged in one dimension (array), 
two dimensions (lattice), three, or more dimensions. 
 Perhaps the most popular CA is Conway’s “Game of Life” 
(Berkelamp, et al., 1982). Each cell can have one of two states: ‘0’ 
(dead) or ‘1’ (alive). Rules consider how many of the eight closest 
neighbours are alive. For a live cell to continue living, it must have 
two or three living neighbours (in any configuration). More than 
three or less than two neighbours implies that the cell will die in 
the next time step. New cells are born on empty cells when they 
have exactly three neighbours. With these simple rules, several 
complex structures emerge: stable structures of different shapes, 
oscillators of different periods, moving structures (gliders, 
spaceships), eaters, glider guns, etc. The structures emerging with 
the simple rules of the Game of Life can be used even to build a 
Universal Turing Machine7. An example of the dynamics of the 
Game of Life is shown in Figure 3. 
                                 
7 To explore the Game of Life and other interesting CA, the reader is advised to download Golly at 
http://golly.sourceforge.net  
 a b 
c d 
Figure 3. Evolution of the Game of Life from a random initial condition (a), where white cells are 
“alive” and black cells are “dead”. After 410 steps (b), certain stable structures have been formed, 
but there are still some active zones. After 861 steps (c), some structures have been destroyed and 
some new ones have been created. Activity continues in the lower part of the lattice. After 1416 
steps (d), the dynamics is periodic, with stable and oscillatory structures. Images created with 
NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999). Figure initially published in Gershenson (2013b). 
 
 Cellular automata have been used in several urban and land-
use models (e.g. Portugali, 2000; Batty, 2005). However, “pure” 
CA models tend to be too formal and abstract, so they have been 
found to be more useful in hybrid models, in many cases 
combining CA with agent-based modelling. 
Individidual-­‐	  and	  Agent-­‐based	  modelling	  
Individual-based modelling is given when social actors or entities 
are represented by separate ‘objects’ within a computational 
simulation. Each object can have different properties, so this 
technique can represent heterogeneous collections of individuals.  
The interactions between the actors are represented by messages 
between the objects of the simulation.  Thus, the mapping 
between what is observed and the model can be very much more 
straightforward with such simulations: each object modelling its 
corresponding actor. 
 When the objects in the simulation have internal processes 
representing their learning or decision making processes so that 
these processes could be usefully interpreted as cognition, we call 
the computational objects “agents” since they can act somewhat 
independently—they have a simple form of agency.  When the 
agents are of this form, one has the technique of Agent-Based 
Modelling (ABM). This technique is very flexible and puts few 
constraints upon the modeller, so the simulations that result are 
difficult to characterize in general but are of various kinds.  An 
accessible introduction to the approach is (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 
2005) and a more comprehensive guide (Edmonds & Meyer, 
2013). 
 In particular, simulations differ greatly as to their level of 
detail, ranging from highly abstract and relatively simple 
simulations to very specific and complicated ones. The key 
difference here is whether the driver for model development is 
simplicity or relevance (Edmonds & Moss, 2005).  Agent-based 
modelling has now been applied to a large number of policy-
relevant subjects, including (to take an arbitrary sample of recent 
applications): energy infrastructure siting (Abdollahian, et al., 
2013), password behaviours within an organization (Renaud, et al., 
2013), mobile banking adoption (Wei, et al., 2013), China’s housing 
market (Zhang, et al., 2013) and return migration (Biondo, et al. 
2013). 
 The problem with ABM lies not in its expressiveness but in 
the complexity of its models (which means that it may be hard to 
understand the models themselves) and establishing the 
relationship between the models and what they represent (Moss & 
Edmonds 2005). 
  
Examples	  
Club	  of	  Rome’s	  “Limits	  to	  Growth”	  
In the early 1970's, on behalf of an international group under the 
name “The Club of Rome” a simulation study was published 
(Meadows et al. 1972) with the attempt to convince humankind 
that there were some serious issues facing it, in terms of a coming 
population, resource, and pollution catastrophe. To do this they 
developed a system dynamics model of the world. Thus, this is a 
fairly simple kind of model that does not explicitly represent the 
parts of a system or its interactions, but rather the feedback cycles 
between key global factors.  It was important to the authors to go 
beyond simple statistical projections of the available data, since 
that missed out the crucial delays in the usually self-correcting 
feedback processes. The results of the simulations were a set of 
computed curves showing such as pollution, population, etc. The 
results indicated that there was a coming critical point in time and 
that a lot of suffering would result, even if humankind managed to 
survive it. 
 The book had a considerable impact, firmly establishing the 
idea that it was possible that humankind could not continue to 
grow indefinitely. The book presented the results of the 
simulations as predictions—a series of what-if scenarios. Whilst 
they did add caveats and explore various possible versions of their 
model, the overall intent of the book was unmistakable: that if we 
did not change our lifestyles, disaster would result.  
 The authors clearly hoped that by using a simulation they 
would be able to make the potential feedback loops real to people. 
Thus this was a use of simulation to illustrate an understanding 
that the authors had. It was thus a model of ideas rather than 
directly of any such data. It did not, and could not, make 
predictions about what will happen in the future, but rather 
illustrate some possibilities. However, the model was not presented 
as such, but as something more scientific in some sense.  It was the 
presentation as ‘scientific’ that made this book such a challenge but 
also what laid it open to criticism (e.g. Cole, et al., 1973).  An 
examination of the model showed that some of its parameters 
were very sensitive and thus had to be ‘tuned’ to get the published 
results (Vermeulen & de Jongh, 1976). In other words, whilst the 
models had an illustrative and exploratory purpose, they were 
presented and criticised as if it was a predictive model. 
 The book made a considerable impact upon the general 
consciousness of the problem, and did act to get people 
questioning previously held assumptions (that we could keep on 
growing economically and physically).  However, it was also largely 
discredited in the eyes of other modellers due to its perceived lack 
of ‘rigor’.  This was somewhat unfair as the alternatives were no 
better in terms of validity or generality. However, a lack of 
humility in terms of its results and the relative simplicity of their 
model did lay it open to such attacks.  The predictions of the book 
have not yet come to pass, but it is not clear that a similar future 
critical point and attendant suffering has been avoided. 
Schelling’s	  Model	  of	  Racial	  Segregation	  
In addition to a host of simpler, analytically expressed models 
(similar in kind to the Club of Rome’s systems dynamics models), 
Schelling developed what we might recognize as a simple agent-
based model (Schelling, 1971; 1978).  It did represent individuals 
and their neighbourhoods explicitly, albeit abstractly in a 2D grid 
with black and white ‘counters’ representing the people.  The 
simulation was very simple—counters were distributed randomly 
to start with then each counter that had less than a given 
percentage (c) of like neighbours moved to a new empty spot.  The 
simulation showed that segregation emerged even with relatively 
low levels of racial bias (values of c down to 30%).  This did not 
relate to any particular data but was rather a counter-example to 
the idea that the observed segregation must be due to strong racial 
prejudice. In other words this was intended to be an exploration of 
ideas to inform policy rather than a direct representation of what 
was happening. It produced an understanding of possible 
segregation processes, and so influenced local policies in Chicago, 
away from focusing on prejudice as a cause of the extreme 
segregation they had. 
Employment	  in	  an	  Arctic	  Community	  
Berman et al. (2004) consider eight employment scenarios defined 
by different policies for tourism and government spending, as well 
as different climate futures, for an ABM case study of sustainability 
in the Arctic community of Old Crow, in Canada. Scenarios were 
developed with the input of local residents: tourism being a policy 
option largely influenced by the autonomous community of Old 
Crow (stemming from their land rights), and attracting great local 
interest. Here the policy options were addressed as a certain type 
of scenario, embedding the behaviour of actors within a few 
possible future contexts.  The simulation here ensured the 
consistency of the scenarios, and helped to integrate the various 
inputs into a coherent whole. 
 The merit of this model is that it can improve the reckoning of 
human and social factors and information into the issues at stake; 
allowing the exploration of some real possible outcomes.  The 
drawback is the multiplication of uncertainties, not least of which 
is that we do not convincingly know how social actors might adapt 
to new circumstances (even if the policy options are relatively 
concrete).    
A	  detailed	  model	  of	  HIV	  spread	  and	  social	  structure	  
Alam et al. (2007) investigate the outcomes indicated by a 
complex, and detailed model of a particular village in the Limpopo 
valley of South Africa. This model in particular looks at many 
aspects of the situation, including: social network, family structure, 
sexual network, HIV spread, death, birth, savings clubs, 
government grants and local employment prospects. It concludes 
with hypotheses about this particular case, showing that complex 
destructive synergies between the spread of HIV and the 
breakdown of social structure were possible, and could be 
exacerbated by the influx of workers from outside due to the 
granting of mining concessions. This does not mean that these 
outcomes will actually occur, but this does provide a focus for 
future field research and may provide thought for policy makers. 
Unfortunately in this case, the conclusions of this study were not 
what the local authority wanted to hear, and so the findings were 
ignored.  This was a model with a high degree of validation, but a 
very specific and complex model taking 3 years to develop. 
Evaluating	  Pandemic	  Preventive	  Measures	  
Bajardi et al. (2011) combined in a model networks and agents to 
model the epidemic spread of the H1N1 influenza in 2009. Nodes 
represent regions, which are linked by the commercial flights 
between their major airports. At each node, agents can be 
susceptible, exposed, infected, or recovered (Anderson & May, 
1992). Adjusting different parameters, the global spread of the 
disease could be reproduced. Travel restrictions were imposed as a 
preventive measure; reducing air travels by 40%. Simulations 
showed that travel restrictions are ineffective to prevent the spread 
of the disease. Comparing with scenarios with no travel restrictions 
or with even more stringent travel restrictions, the authors found 
that the disease reached a peak almost on the same day. 
 This is a theory-based model intended for predictive purposes.  
Its validity depends upon the approximations and assumptions in 
the model, including the characteristics of the social network used 
in the model. 
Prospects	  and	  Dangers	  for	  Complex	  Policy	  Modelling	  
All models have limits—not only limits in the accuracy of their 
predictions but in the expression of the situations under which 
such projections are based.   The nature of complex situations 
means that attempts to use models to aid policy formulation are 
susceptible to some particular dangers and pitfalls, including: 
• Confusing a model that has exploratory or explanatory 
purposes for one that is predictive. 
• Preferring a ‘black box’ model that seems to give definite 
predictions despite neither understanding it nor knowing 
that it is reliable for this purpose. 
• Trying to use a model that has been adapted within a highly 
specific situation out of its original context. 
• Attempting very general or simple models of policy issues 
probably means sacrificing direct validity for an indirect, 
analogical relationship only. 
 Complex models of the kind described here (and elsewhere in 
this book) have the potential to express a broader range of kinds 
of situations than previous approaches.  They are thus not so 
limited by the kind of ‘brave’ assumptions that bedevil models 
where analytic results are deemed necessary.  They are also ideal 
for the exploration and “laying bare” complex dynamics.  For this 
reason, they are prospective as an important tool in the exploration 
and consideration of policy options. In particular, more descriptive 
models can be directly related to what they are modelling, allowing 
a greater range of data and input to be utilized in their specification 
and validation (both high SM and SR in terms of the above 
discussion). 
 Given the fact that models of complex systems will offer a 
limited predictability, it is advisable to complement this lack of 
predictability with adaptability (Gershenson, 2007). This will 
enable decision makers to take the best choice for the specific 
circumstances that are faced, as adaptability implies a distinction of 
current circumstances that purely predictive models do not 
consider.  
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